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ORIGINALISM THROUGH RAZ-COLORED GLASSES
LOUIS E. FELDMANt

INTRODUCTION
A central aim of originalism is to provide judges with a valuefree theory of constitutional interpretation. Originalists want to
restrain judges from independent consideration of the values and
norms that ultimately justify any constitutional decision. When
considering a constitutional issue, judges instead should defer first
to the clear language of the Constitution, and second to the
manifest intent of the framing generation for resolution of textual
ambiguities. By binding judges to (1) an authoritative written text
and (2) an authoritative theory of interpretation based solely on
historical investigation, originalism seeks to define a judicial role
that involves no independent examination of the moral issues
underlying constitutional questions. The result is that an originalist
judge substitutes the moral choices of the framers for his own when
interpreting the Constitution. Since the moral balance was already
struck by the framers, the judge is prevented from acting on any
further consideration of the relevant moral issues.
But if judging is a rational process and if acting rationally is to
act based on all the reasons that pertain to a particular decision,
originalism must explain how it can be rational for a judge not to
consider the moral dimension of constitutional questions. Originalists must contend with the question of how it is rational for the
judge, in making a constitutional decision, to suspend consideration
of factors that the judge knows to be relevant to interpretation of
the constitutional text governing the decision. This question
involves an examination of a more general question about authority:
When is it ever rational for an agent to refuse to act on the balance
of reasons that apply to a given situation, and instead simply to obey
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the dictates of another? Judicial deference to framers' intent
exemplifies a general model of authority in which the subject does
what he is told without independently considering the reasons for
his actions, other than the fact that he has been so instructed.
This kind of authority is known as practical authority, a notion
currently associated with the legal philosopher Joseph Raz. 1 Raz
attempts both to clarify the notion of practical authority, and to
explain when the grant of such authority is justified, such that the
subject is obligated to obey. In this Comment, I explore whether
Raz's theory of practical authority can provide originalists with a
justificatory basis for the claim that judges should defer to the
judgments of the framers when interpreting the Constitution.
Before examining the interpretive methodology that judges
apply to constitutional adjudication it is necessary to note two

questions that I do not address:

whether the Constitution is a

source of authority for judges, such that constitutional interpretation is a legitimate judicial enterprise; and what comprises the
authoritative Constitution. 2 The question whether the Constitution
itself is authoritative for judges is presumed to be answered in the
affirmative. 3 Regarding what is the authoritative constitution, Ijoin
'Joseph Raz is "one of the great legal thinkers of our age." Martin L. Levine,
Foreword, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 731 (1989). His works were the subject of a
symposium, see Symposium, The Works ofJoseph Raz, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 731 (1989),
and his recent book, JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986), has been
described as coming "closer to the truth about political morality than anyone has for
nearly a century." Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality
of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 995 (1989).
Over the past several years, many other scholars have commented on, criticized,
and debated the implications of Raz's analysis of political authority in terms of a
theory of practical authority. See Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18
PHIL. Topics 5 (1990); Heidi M. Hurd, ChallengingAuthority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611
(1991); Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 827
(1989); Stephen R. Perry, Second-OrderReasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theoy, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 913 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 645 (1991); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority, 18
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209 (1989).
2 The independence of these three questions (How should the Constitution be
interpreted? Does the Constitution have authority? What is the Constitution?) has
been noted by many constitutional scholars. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION 25 (1987); WALTER F. MURPHY, THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1 (1989); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION at vi (1986); Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 113-18 (1989); Larry Simon, The Authority of the
Constitutionand Its Meaning: A Prefaceto a Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 603, 606-07 (1985).
- According to Henry Monaghan, "[t]he authoritative status of the written
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Justice Hugo Black,4 Edwin Meese, 5 and Michael Moore 6 in
adopting the view that only the written text of the Constitution,
what Moore calls the "syntactic Constitution," 7 is endowed with
authoritative status. The semantics of the Constitution, what that
authoritative written text means, must be supplied by a theory of
interpretation, but that determination must not be folded into the
substance of the canonical Constitution. To do otherwise, to
include within the notion of "Constitution" aspects of meaning, is
to deprive the Constitution itself of authority, except to the extent
8
that the text accords with an external standard of correctness.
Presuming the authoritative status of only the written text of the
constitution is ... an incontestable first principle for theorizing about American
constitutional law.... [T]he binding quality of the constitutional text is itself
incapable of and not in need of further demonstration." Henry P. Monaghan, Our
PerfectConstitution,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,383-84 (1981); see also Ronald Dworkin, The
Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 472 (1981) ("Any recognizable theory of
judicial review is interpretive in the sense that it aims to provide an interpretation of
the Constitution as an original foundational legal document."); Moore, supra note 2,
at 113-14 (arguing thatjudicial review is legitimate only if based on the constitutional
text); Richard S. Kay, The Bork Nomination and the Definition of 'the Constitution," 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 1190,1202 (1990) (book review) (arguing that even those who support
"wide discretion in judicial review [are] unwilling to let go of the rhetorical support
of the constitutional text").
Some of the arguments made in Part II.B. against according practical authority
to the framers over constitutional interpretation, see infra notes 147-177 and
accompanying text, could be applied with equal force to the authority of the
Constitution itself. There are other theories of authority, however, that could
account for the authoritativeness of the Constitution without encountering the
justificatory difficulties examined in Part II.B. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 1920 (outlining a version of theoretical authority that might be called "as if" authority);
Hurd, supra note 1, at 1615-28 (analyzing the theories of practical authority,
influential authority, and theoretical authority and advocating the last); Moore, supra
note 1, at 883-94 (proposing a theory of influential authority, which he refers to as
"new reasons" authority); Regan, supranote 1, at 1011-18 (advocating a distinct theory
of theoretical authority); Schauer, supra note 1, at 674-79 (arguing for a theory of
"presumptive" authority).
As I will discuss in Part I.B., the problem for originalism is not that practical
authority may not be a satisfactory account of political authority, but that originalism
presumes the model of practical authority to describe the kind of deference judges
must show to the framers. See infra notes 43-71 and accompanying text.
4 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509-10 (1965) (Black,J., dissenting);
HUGO L. BLACK, A CONsTrTUTIoNAL FAITH 10-11 (1969).
5 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 981-82
(1987).
6 See Moore, supra note 2, at 115-14.
7 Id. at 117.
8 For a detailed account of this argument, see id. at 117-18. But see Simon, supra
note 2, at 619-30 (implying that to give authority to the Constitution is actually to give
authority to the principles that underlie it).
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Constitution, I focus on originalism through the powerful lens of
Joseph Raz's theory of practical authority.
In Part I, I explain Raz's conception of practical authority and
demonstrate that originalism implicitly adopts the Razian model to
describe the relationship between the framers and the judge
interpreting the Constitution. Based on his analysis of practical
reason, Raz develops a general theory of practical authority and
concludes that legal authority is a special case of practical authority.9 A working definition of practical authority is that when an
entity possessed of practical authority issues an authoritative
utterance, the subjects of that entity (those persons who are within
the scope of the entity's authority) must treat the utterance as a
sufficient reason for acting in accordance with the utterance; the
subjects are not free to decide on their own whether what the entity
has commanded is, all things considered, the right thing to do.
The practical authority model for legal authority is consistent
with a jurisprudence of original intention. The originalist description of constitutional adjudication mandates that the judge treat the
will of the framers, as manifested by their utterances, as sufficient
reason for according to constitutional text the meaning implied by
that will. The judge is barred from further inquiring whether the
interpretation derived is, all things considered, the correct one. For
the originalist judge, the framers are a binding practical authority.10
In Part II, I consider the possible justifications for according
practical authority to the framers. I first describe Raz'sjustificatory
arguments and then explore originalism's implicit rejection of those
arguments.
Raz's explanation of the legitimacy of practical
authority is based on what he calls the "service conception" of
authority."1 An entity's exercise of practical authority is legitimate
only when that entity is a better weigher of reasons for action than
the entity's subjects.' 2 While this "Normal Justification Thesis"
implies a rather piecemeal obligation to obey the law for ordinary
citizens, Raz's thesis yields a much broader obligation for judges to
submit to law's authority.' 3 Nevertheless, originalists must reject
Raz's justification of the exercise of practical authority, since the

9 See infra notes 14-53 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 122-45 and accompanying text.
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service conception of authority fails to provide judges with a
binding, general obligation to obey. Although they implicitly adopt
Raz's conceptual model of practical authority for the Constitution's
framers, originalists must reject Raz's thesis that accounts for the
legitimacy of granting such authority. I also examine in Part II other
possible justifications for the framers' practical authority, in
particular the notion ofjudicial restraint. Although I conclude that
it is unlikely that originalism is capable of providing a justification
sufficient for the sweeping authority that it demands judges accord
to the framers, it is not the purpose of this Comment to engage in
a polemic against originalism. Its purpose rather is to explore the
intersection between constitutional interpretation and general legal
theory. By testing the past decade's most debated method of
constitutional interpretation against the precepts of the leading
theory of law's authority, I hope to bridge the often daunting gap
between general legal philosophy and applied jurisprudence.
I. A PRACTICAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
A. Raz's Model of PracticalAuthority
Raz's account of authority attempts to explain how it can be
rational to do as the law commands simply because the law
commands. He believes that legal authority must be a particular
example of practical authority, 14 a special kind of relationship
between two entities. X has practical authority with respect to Y if
and only if X's utterances give Y sufficient reasons to act in
accordance with those utterances. 15 This Part will explore Raz's
conception of how a practical authority relationship manifests itself;
14 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 23-37. The belief that legal authority is a form of
practical authority has traditionally dominated legal thought. See e.g., RICHARD E.
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POI-TICAL AUTHoRrrY 90-91 (1980) (noting that

anarchists, moderates, and conservatives have all subscribed to the model of practical
authority); Hurd, supranote 1, at 1618-22 (observing that legal authority has usually
been described in terms of practical authority).
Whether law's authority is best described in terms of practical authority is a
debate within the larger dispute between legal positivists, who advocate a practical
authority view of law, and natural law theorists, whose insistence on the necessary
relationship between morality and law demands a rejection of any model of authority
that deprives an agent of moral independence.
15 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 35, 37; see also Moore, supra note 1, at 830. The
phrase "practical authority" refers to both this kind of authority relationship and the
entity that possesses such authority. Thus, if X possesses practical authority with
regard to Y, then X is a practical authority for Y.
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that is, how do a legal authority's commands obligate the law's
subjects? Later, I will examine Raz's account of when an entity's
claim of practical authority is legitimate. Since Raz's analysis of
legal authority is predicated upon his description of practical
reasoning, that is where I will begin.
Practical reasoning is the type of deliberation used to decide
what ought to be done and how; it is the process of deciding what
action, if any, ought to be taken in a given situation. Acting in
accordance with the balance of reasons, all things considered, is
fundamental to practical rationality. 16 Accordingly, the answer to
the question "What shall I do?" is always "That which is supported
by the best reasons." 17 For any potential action there are reasons
both for and against taking the action. These reasons may consist
of values such as justice and fairness, the possible consequences of
the action (both positive and negative), the existence of a prior
promise to do the action, or any other consideration that bears on
the justifiability of taking the action. Some reasons carry greater
weight than others. A generally accepted model of rationality
depicts a person as considering all these reasons, resolving any
conflicts according to the relative weights of conflicting reasons, and
18
acting on the balance.
Reasons for action are either "content-dependent" or "contentindependent." A reason is content-dependent if there is some
substantive connection between the reason and the action to which
it pertains. Specifically, a content-dependent reason for action is a
reason because the action it supports is correct on the merits. For
example, the fact that it is raining is a content-dependent reason for
taking along an umbrella when going outside, insofar as staying dry
is better than getting soaked. On the other hand, a contentindependent reason is a reason for action regardless of the rightness
of the action the reason encourages. According to Raz, a "reason
16 See JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-37 (2d ed. 1990); Hurd,
supra note 1, at 1613 (citing Donald Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible?,
in MORAL CONCEPTS 93 (Joel Feinberg ed., 1969)).
17 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 29; KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEw 86-89

(1958).
18 See RAZ, supra note 16, at 35; Hurd, supra note 1, at 1615-20. Note the
similarity of this description to the "Hand Formula," which purported to quantify the
negligence standard in tort law. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947). An action is negligent (unreasonable or irrational) if the cost of
not taking the action (the reasons for acting) is less than the product of the
probability that harm will result from the action and the gravity of the harm that
would result (the reasons against acting).
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is content-independent if there is no direct connection between the
reason and the action for which it is a reason." 19 The authoritative status of the reason's source justifies a content-independent
reason. When your mother asks you to take your umbrella with you
when you go outside, your mother's request stands as a contentindependent reason for taking your umbrella, even if you know
there is no chance of rain. 2 ° In a sense, "content-independent"
can be thought of as a label applicable to reasons for action
produced by reason-generating machines (such as mothers). The
reason-giving force of a content-independent reason derives from
its pedigree, not its substantive content.
The reasons relevant to what one ought to do, all things
considered, are objective, not subjective, because they need not
motivate. You may even be totally unaware of the existence of a
reason that figures in the balance of reasons. For example, if you
wake up in the morning after a late night out on the town, and you
just do not feel like going to work, you still have reasons to go to
work (to meet your mortgage payments), even if you cannot
21
remember those reasons or if they simply do not move you.
Raz's theory requires that reasons for action be external to an
individual's beliefs or desires, or to any set of universally shared
subjective beliefs or desires. As Michael Moore writes: "Rather, it
is morality that is reason-giving even if some, most, or all of us are
too blind, too weak, or too immoral to be moved by such rea22
sons."
Although Raz does not say so explicitly, the existence of
objective reasons for action is essential to his explanation of legal
authority as part of a general theory of practical reasoning. 2 In
az's view, the reasons supplied by morality have varying weights.
When a person attempts to decide what he ought to do in the face
of apparently conflicting reasons, he is (theoretically) able to arrive
at a "correct" balance, since each reason should be counted
according to its relative weight. Each person is then obligated to act
24
in accordance with the result of such a balancing process.
19 RAZ, supra note 1, at 35.

See Hurd, supra note 1, at 1616 n.10; see also RAZ, supra note 1, at 35-37.
179-80 (suggesting that reasons have moral relevance
regardless of one's awareness of or sensitivity to them).
22 Moore, supra note 1, at 842.
23 See id. at 843.
24 See RAZ, supra note 16, at 27; Moore, supra note 1, at 845.
20

21 See RAZ, supra note 16, at
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Since Raz intends his explanation of how law obligates to be
based on this general account of analytic morality (we are obligated
to act rationally, in accordance with the balance of reasons for
action), he needs reasons that have objective existence outside the
context of merely subjective beliefs and desires. If reasons are
subjective, they have no obligatory force. 25 An attempt to establish obligation by reference to subjective reasons-by positing that
the only reasons we have for action are our own desires, and further
that to be true to oneself one should act in accordance with those
desires-retains the objective idea of being true to oneself.
Obligation (or "oughtness") is impossible without objective reasons.
Rejecting objective morality is certainly not unheard-of, 26 but it is
inconsistent with Raz's theory of legal obligation.
This model of rationality presents a problem for Raz's notion of
practical authority. If the essence of rationality is to act on the
balance of reasons, all things considered, how can it be rational to
forego a balance of reasons analysis in favor of obeying the
commands of a practical authority? Raz summarizes the paradox:
"To be subject to authority, it is argued, is incompatible with
reason, for reason requires that one should always act on the
balance of reasons of which one is aware." 27 Raz's solution to this
paradox is that when it comes to practical reasoning and rationality,
there are reasons, and then there are reasons.
Raz divides reasons into "first-order" and "second-order"
reasons. A first-order reason is simply any of the reasons for action
already discussed. A second-order reason is "any reason to act for
a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason." 28 While firstorder reasons are reasons for action, second-order reasons are
reasons for acting on reasons. "To conform to a second-order
reason, in other words, it is not enough to do some specified action;
rather, one must do the act for a certain reason." 29 While the
25 See RAZ, supra note 16, at 34 (implying that while objective values provide
generally applicable reasons for action that create obligations, desires and interests
provide only subjective, non-obligatory reasons); see also RAZ, supra note 1, at 84
("Reasons precede the will. Though the latter can, within limits, create reasons, it can
do so
only when there is a non-will-based reason why it should.").
26

See Heidi M. Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on
Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1988) (discussing the prevalence of moral
skepticism
in legal theory).
27
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3 (1979).

28 RAZ, supra note 16, at 39.
29 Moore, supra note 1, at 849.
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"balance of reasons" view of rationality obtains 0for first-order
reasons, it is inapplicable to second-order reasons.3
There are positive and negative second-order reasons. A
positive second-order reason is a reason to act for a particular
reason. A negative second-order reason is a reason to refrain from
acting for a particular reason.31 Raz calls negative second-order
reasons "exclusionary reasons,"3 2 and they play an important role
in his theory of practical authority. Exclusionary reasons "are
reasons for not being motivated in one's actions by certain (valid)
considerations.... They exclude reasons from being one's motivation for action .... "3 According to Raz, an exclusionary reason
requires that if a person acts, then that action must not be undertaken on account of a certain reason. Exclusionary reasons "change
the moral landscape"3 4 by depriving first-order reasons of the
moral force they would have in the balance of reasons, absent the
exclusionary reason.
Whenever a conflict appears to arise between a second-order
exclusionary reason and a contrary first-order reason, the secondorder reason prevails by virtue of being of a higher order.3 5 The
conflict never actually arises, according to Raz, because no balancing
of reasons is needed.3 6 The exclusionary reason does not defeat
the contrary first-order reason by virtue of its greater weight.
Instead, the exclusionary reason deprives the contrary first-order
reason of any weight whatsoever, excluding it from being counted
37
in the balance of reasons.
Raz offers as an example of an exclusionary reason a father's
order to his son that the son not act on his mother's instructions.
The father's order is an exclusionary reason, because it gives the son
a reason "never to take [his mother's] instructions as reasons for
action."3 8 The father is not telling his son not to do the things
that the mother instructs. The son may still act in accordance with
his mother's instructions, and yet be obeying his father, so long as
so See RAZ, supra note 16, at 36-40.

31 See RAZ, supra note 27, at 17.
2 d.; RAZ, supra note 16, at 39.
s RAZ, supra note 16, at 185.

Moore, supra note 1, at 850.
35 See RAZ, supra note 16, at 46; Perry, supra note 1, at 913-14.
6 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37 See RAZ, supra note 16, at 36; Moore, supra note 1, at 850.
38 RAZ, supra note 27, at 17.
3
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s9
the son does not act because of his mother's instructions.
Before the father's order, the mother's instructions were relevant,
first-order reasons for action in accordance with those instructions.
After the father's order, the mother's instructions are excluded
from consideration in the son's moral balancing of what action he

ought to take.
Perhaps a more familiar example is this exhortation of Jesus to
his disciples:
Beware of practicing your righteousness before men to be
noticed by them; otherwise you have no reward with your Father
who is in heaven.
When therefore you give alms, do not sound a trumpet before
you, as the hypocrites do in the40 synagogues and in the streets, that
they may be honored by men.
The message is clear: it is right to give to charity, but wrong to give
so that one "may be honored by men." Jesus's instruction provides
(or at least, describes the existence of) an exclusionary reason not
to consider the impression one will make when deciding whether to
give to charity. You should not act for the reason that others will
notice and honor you as a result of your action. The exclusionary
reason of Jesus's exhortation deprives self-aggrandizement of any
41
weight in the moral balance.
The commands of practical authorities provide not only
exclusionary reasons, but also new, content-independent first-order
reasons for acting in compliance with those commands. The
command of a practical authority is thus not only a first-order
reason for acting in accordance with it, but it also excludes from
consideration all conflicting first-order reasons. Raz labels this
combination of a first-order reason and an exclusionary reason a
"protected reason." 4 2 A reason is protected because it has no
viable opponents when it is considered in the overall mix of
4
reasons. 3
An example of a law functioning as a protected reason is a sign
posted on the edge of a field stating: "BY ORDER OF CITY
See id.
Matthew 6:1-2 (New American Standard Bible).
41 Note that under Raz's topology of reasons, the exhortation provides an
exclusionary reason only if, absent the exhortation, self-aggrandizement would be a
valid first-order reason. See RAZ, supra note 16, at 183, 185.
42 See RAZ, supra note 27, at 18.
43 See id.; Moore, supra note 1, at 851.
39

40
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COUNCIL, DO NOT WALK UPON THE GRASS." Suppose it is a
cold night in December and the grass is frozen solid. You can
either obediently walk around the field or save yourself twenty
minutes of struggling against a freezing wind. You are absolutely
certain that no police are within miles. There are plenty of good
reasons for cutting across the field; it is difficult to think of any
good reasons why you should not. But the sign, speaking with the
authoritative voice of the law, purports to provide just that: a
perfectly good and sufficient reason not to cut across the field.
According to Raz, not only does that sign give you a sufficiently
good first-order reason not to spare yourself twenty minutes of
misery, it also gives you an exclusionary reason to refrain from even
taking into practical consideration your comfort when deciding
whether or not to cross the field.
Armed with the concept of protected reasons, Raz develops a
special description of how legal authorities function. This description is founded on two theses: the "Dependence Thesis" and the
"Preemptive Thesis. " 44 The Dependence Thesis states that "all
authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already
independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are
relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the
directive." 45 The Dependence Thesis is a moral thesis about how
a legal authority should exercise its authority. 46 The thesis establishes that legal authorities cannot be arbitrary in propounding laws,
but must instead take into account all of the content-dependent
first-order reasons for action that antecedently figured (or should
have figured) in their subjects' practical reasoning.
If issued by a legal authority that complies with the Dependence
Thesis, a law is a special kind of first-order reason. Each law
"depends" on the antecedently existing first-order reasons that
applied to the subjects before the law was passed. Laws thus "sum
up" the antecedently existing balance of first-order reasons. Firstorder reasons that sum up the antecedently existing balance of firstorder reasons are called "dependent reasons." 47 The first-order
44 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 41-53, 57-62.
45
Id. at 47.
46 See id. at 53.
47 See id. at 41. The term "dependent reasons" also refers to the first-order
reasons on which a reason depends. The context should make clear what meaning
is appropriate. It is important not to confuse the terms "dependent reason" and
"content-dependent reason." A law issued in accordance with the Dependence Thesis
is a dependent reason, but it is also a content-independent reason because its
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reasons that legal authorities must consider when promulgating
authoritative commands include justice, fairness, equality, democracy, liberty, and economy, among others. In short, legal authorities
must promulgate laws that are dependent reasons based upon the
universe of rule of law virtues, since these virtues are the antecedently relevant content-dependent first-order reasons for action in a
48

just society.

The complement to the Dependence Thesis is the Preemptive
Thesis, which states: "the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to
be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do,
but should exclude and take the place of some of them." 49 This
thesis follows from the Dependence Thesis. Because a law sums up
the antecedently existing first-order reasons applicable to its
subjects, the law's subjects are preempted from acting on those
reasons. If the subjects were to consider the content-dependent
first-order reasons on which the law depends in addition to
considering the content-independent first-order reason provided by
the law itself (which sums up the weights of those reasons), then
they would be double-counting the antecedent first-order reasons.
Since a first-order reason should only be accorded its true
weight, and since the law sums up the weights of all antecedently
existing first-order reasons, the subjects are preempted from
reconsidering those first-order reasons. As a consequence of the
Preemptive Thesis, subjects faced with an authoritative command
from a legal authority are precluded from considering the justificatory values that, according to the Dependence Thesis, underlie the
command. The subjects are barred from looking to equality, justice,
or any other rule of law virtue (or relevant value) when deciding
what they ought to do. They must look to the command itself as the
only reason for action.
A law is thus both a dependent reason and an exclusionary
reason of a particular type. It is a reason to refrain from acting on
the balance of antecedently existing first-order reasons on which the
law depends. Laws are therefore protected reasons. In addition to
authority derives from its pedigree. The antecedently existing first-order reasons on
which the law depends are content-dependent reasons, since their status as reasons
derives from the merits of the actions for or against which they are reasons. See supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
48 See RAZ, supra note 27, at 210-29; Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 291-94 (1985); Moore, supra note 2, at 112.
49 RAZ, supra note 1, at 46.
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being dependent, first-order reasons for action, the utterances of
legal authorities constitute second-order exclusionary reasons that
bar consideration of both the underlying content-dependent firstorder reasons that justify any action and any other contrary firstorder reasons. Laws therefore operate as content-independent
reasons for action.5 ° For its subjects, a law's obligatory status is
unrelated to notions of rationality or morality because by virtue of
the Preemption Thesis, concerns about what makes something
moral or rational (justice, fairness, liberty) are beyond the bounds
of permissible consideration.5 1 The commands of legal authority
stand as intermediaries between individual actors and the "right
reasons which apply to them." 52 People are thereby isolated from
the values that ultimately justify their actions.
In sum, before the existence of a law relating to a particular
action an agent has first-order reasons for and against taking the
action. The passage by a legal authority of a relevant law gives the
agent a new, content-independent, first-order reason for action that
depends on the pre-existing content-dependent first-order reasons.
In addition to being a first-order reason for action, the law provides
a second-order, exclusionary reason to refrain from acting on the
first-order reasons on which the law is dependent. The law is a
second-order reason to exclude from the balance of first-order
reasons all reasons relating to the action's justifiability, except for
the first-order reason that the law itself demands the action. Thus,
Raz's analysis of how legal authority obligates hinges on the capacity
of legal authorities to create exclusionary reasons. 53 Through his
account of law's exclusionary reasons Raz explains the functional
aspect of law's practical authority. The question remaining is when
the exercise of such powerful authority is justified. I consider this
question in the subsequent discussion of the legitimacy of constitutional authority.

50 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
51 This slightly overstates the point, since Raz maintains that abstract consideration of excluded first-order reasons is not barred, as long as they do not actually
motivate. According to Raz: "There is no reason to prevent a person.., from going
through the [excluded reasons] to amuse himself or as an exercise,... so long as he
does not ... act on it." RAZ, supra note 16, at 48; see also RAz, supra note 1, at 38-42;
Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (1989).
2Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 69 MONIsT 295, 299 (1985).
" See Alexander, supra note 1, at 5.
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B. The PracticalAuthority of the Framers
Having laid out Raz's conceptual model of practical authority,
I turn my attention to originalism. Originalist interpretive theory
adopts a view of the authority of the Constitution's framers vis-a-vis
the judge equivalent to the judge's treating the framers as if they
possessed Razian practical authority over the judge's interpretive
decisions. An overview of the basic tenets of originalism will
demonstrate the congruence between originalist notions of the
authority of the framers and Raz's model.
As used in this Comment, "originalism" means that theory of
constitutional interpretation that requires a judge to apply the
Constitution according to an interpretation of the text that best
represents the understanding of the "framers," those who drafted
or ratified the Constitution and its amendments. 54 Through
diligent historical investigation, the judge must discover what the
authors intended their words to mean and must be bound by that
55
intended meaning when interpreting the Constitution's text.
Justice Sutherland offered one of the clearestjudicial expressions of
the originaist position: "The whole aim of construction, as applied
to a provision of the Constitution, is ... to ascertain and give effect
56
to the intent, of its framers and the people who adopted it."
Chief Justice Rehnquist has written that the role of the judge is to
enforce the understandings and values that "may be derived from
the language and intent of the framers." 57 According to Judge
Bork, "the framers' intentions ... are the sole legitimate premise
from which constitutional analysis may proceed."58 The judge is
bound by the original intentions of "those who framed, proposed,
and ratified" the Constitution and its amendments. 59 Another
54

The term "originalism" was coined by Paul Brest.

See Paul Brest, The

MisconceivedQuestfor the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204,204 (1980). The
term "interpretivism" is used by some scholars to refer to the same concept. See, e.g.,
Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1986).
55 See Edwin Meese, Address Before the Washington, D.C. Chapter of the
Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE:
INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 31, 33-36 (1986) [hereinafter GREAT
DEBATE].

56 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Sutherland,

J., dissenting).
57 William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,54 TEX. L. REV. 693,695
(1976).
58 Robert Bork, Tradition and Morality in ConstitutionalLaw, in VIEWS FROM THE
BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTrTUTIONAL POLITICS 166, 171 (Mark W. Cannon
& David M. O'Brien eds., 1985).
" Robert Bork, Address Before the University of San Diego Law School (Nov. 18,
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originalist scholar similarly states that judges must apply "the rules
of the written constitution in the sense in which
those rules were
60
understood by the people who enacted them."
In practice, when reviewing the constitutionality of legislation,
the originalist judge is to look to the text of the Constitution, as
understood by its drafters, and discern the "core value that the
framers intended to protect."6 1 If the statute in question violates
that "core value," it is unconstitutional. Otherwise, the legislation
must stand. In determining how broadly to characterize the core
value being protected the judge is bound to "choos[e] no level of
generality higher than that which interpretation of the words,
structure and history of the Constitution fairly support." 62 The
level of generality at which the core value is properly stated is thus
precisely that level of generality intended by the framers. Originalist interpretive theory binds the judge to the framers' choices of
which values are to be protected as well as the scope of protection,
even if the language of the Constitution is general enough to
accommodate protections broader than what can be fairly imputed
to the framers from historical evidence.
A major consequence of originalism is that the will of the
63
framers is at least as authoritative as the text of the Constitution.
Indeed, originalists hold that the judge's oath of office entails a
promise to enforce the intent of the framers. 64 One originalist,
Richard Kay, denies that judges owe their allegiance "only to the
mere words of the Constitution." 65 They must defer instead to the
"exercise of human will"6 6 that culminated in constitutional lawmaking. The originalistjudge views the written text of the Constitution as a heuristic guide to uncovering the authoritative will of the
framers.

67

This approach to constitutional interpretation furthers one of
the declared goals of originalism's advocates: judicial restraint.
1985), in GREAT DEBATE,

supra note

55, at 43, 43.

60 Richard S. KayAdherence to the OriginalIntentionsin ConstitutionalAdjudication:

Three Objections andResponses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226,230 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
61 Bork, supra note 59, at 46.
62
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
6

3 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY 368 (1977).
" See, e.g., EdwardJ. MelvinJudicial Activism-The Violation of an Oath, 27 CATH.
LAW. 283, 284 (1982) ("[W]hen ajudge takes his oath to uphold the Constitution he
promises to carry out the intention of the framers.").
65 Kay, supra note 60, at 230.
66 Id. at 232.
67 See Brest, supra note 54, at 209 n.28.
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Most originalists believe that "any defensible theory of constitutional
interpretation must demonstrate that it has the capacity to control
judges." 68 Originalist theory restrains judges by restricting them
to a value-free method of interpretation. Originalism demands that
the judge adopt a posture of deference with respect to the framers;
the judge is precluded from any independent consideration of
substantive values when attempting to give meaning to ambiguous
constitutional text. As President Ronald Reagan put it when he
nominated Judge Bork for appointment to the Supreme Court:
"[J]udges' personal ... values should not be part of their constitutional interpretations."6 9
Rather, the judge is bound by the
intentions of the framers, and the value choices implied thereby, in
determining how to apply any given constitutional provision. Judge
Bork and other originalists find fault with any interpretive method
that, by giving effect to judges' value choices, encroaches on the
70
supreme constitutional authority of the framers.
The point of originalist interpretation is to apply only those
values "constitutionalized by the framers," with no application of the
values of the judge, or anyone else. 7 1 The framers' intentions
form an impenetrable barrier between the interpreting judge and
considerations of substantive morality that otherwise would be
relevant to the interpretive enterprise. The moral balance having
already been struck by the framers, the judge is prevented from
acting on further consideration of the otherwise relevant moral
issues.
The deferential judicial posture demanded by originalism is
equivalent to a requirement that the judge treat the framers as
possessing Razian practical authority over the judge's interpretive

8

Bork, supra note 59, at 45; see also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A

CRTICAL ANALYsIs OF CONsTrrTIoNAL LAw 23 (1988) ("[Originalism avoids]judicial

tyranny. By confining the judges to the words of the Constitution as understood by
the framers, we ensure that they will not go too far; we bar them from making
decisions that in a democratic society are properly made by a political majority.");
Berger, supra note 54, at 1 (commenting that interpretation does not give license to
alter).
69 President's Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an
Associate Justice, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 761 (July 1, 1987), reprinted in
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW70267-68 (1990).

See David AJ. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations,65 N.Y.U. L. REv.

1373, 1377 (1990) (reviewing BORK, supra note 69).
71 Robert W. Bennett, The Mission ofMoral Reasoning in ConstitutionalLaw, 58 S.

CAL. L. REv. 647, 650 (1985). For a discussion of the value ofjudicial restraint in
promoting democracy, see infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
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enterprise. The judge is bound not only by the framers' authoritative utterance (the Constitution), but also by the framers' will (intentions). In the absence of authoritative framers' intent, judicial
interpretation of facially ambiguous constitutional provisions
necessarily involves an appeal to substantive values. 72 These
values, including democracy, liberty, separation of powers, fairness,
and equality, 73 constitute reasons for action that the judge would
presumably balance in attempting to determine the meaning to
assign to a given constitutional provision. 74 They are reasons for
action because the resultant balance would dictate how the judge
should act in interpreting the language of the Constitution and
applying it to the case at hand. For the originalist judge, however,
evidence of framers' intent provides new reasons for action. In
deciding how to interpret the text such a judge must take into
account the core value implicated by historical evidence of the
framers' understanding of the text's meaning. Furthermore, the
framers' intentions bar the judge from basing his interpretive
decision on consideration of values not specified in the historical
record. In addition to providing the judge with new reasons to act,
evidence of framers' intent provides the judge with exclusionary
reasons to refrain from acting on the reasons given by substantive
values.

75

Presumably, the framers considered substantive issues such as
justice and equality when they drafted the Constitution and formed
their intentions regarding its meaning. Because the conclusions
they reached sum up the weights of those values, an appeal to the
framers' intent satisfies Raz's Dependence Thesis. 76 It then
follows from the Preemptive Thesis77 that the judge must not
reconsider those substantive values that informed the framers'
moral balancing, else he would be guilty of double-counting.
Additionally, the framers' intentions have exclusionary force. The
judge is precluded from taking into account any considerations,
moral or otherwise, that might militate against adopting the intent
of the framers as the meaning of constitutional text. In sum, the
judge must treat the intentions of the framers as giving what Raz
See Moore, supra note 2, at 112.
73 See id.
74 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the "balance of
reasons" view of rationality).
75 Seesupranotes 31-41 and accompanying text (discussing exclusionary reasons).
76 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing Dependence Thesis).
77 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Preemptive Thesis).
72
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calls protected reasonsfor action when interpreting constitutional text.
Original intent stands as a barrier between the interpreting judge
and the substantive values that motivated those original intentions. 78 The. originalist conception of the relationship between the
framers and the judge exactly tracks Raz's analysis of how practical
79
authority works.
An example of judicial deference to the practical authority of
the framers is provided by Bowers v. Hardwick,8 0 in which the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute outlawing sodomy. The reasoning of this opinion
has been characterized as evincing "a judicial posture of deference
to external authority."81 In Hardwick, the Supreme Court denied
that it was engaging in any sort of moral balancing to determine,
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the
82
permissibility of Georgia's legal repression of homosexual sex.
In disclaiming any reliance on substantive morality as a basis for
constitutional interpretation, the Court insisted that it was bound
by the moral decisions of those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution. In determining that there is no "fundamental right"
to engage in sodomy, the Court relied on the fact that sodomy "was
forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified
the Bill of Rights," 83 and that "when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States ... had criminal sodomy
laws." 8 4 Given that there was no evidence that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect a person's right to
engage in homosexual sodomy (that is, as long as homosexual
78 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing protected reasons).
79 It might be objected that my analysis is unfairly drawn and that I have set up
a strawman version of originalism, since I focus almost exclusively on strict,
intentionalist originalism rather than one of originalism's more pragmatic and flexible
incarnations. This objection does not stand for two reasons. First, my analysis could,
with some modification, be extended to encompass an interpretive methodology
predicated upon original meaning or original understanding, or for that matter, any
method of interpretation to the extent that it relies on appeal to an authoritative
historical interpreter. See infra note 161. Second, the purpose of this Comment is
not to undermine originalism, but to investigate the ramifications of applyingJoseph

Raz's theory of practical authority to a popular method of constitutional interpretation.
80 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
81 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1988).
82 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 ("This case does not require a judgment on
whether laws against sodomy.., are wise or desirable.").
83 Id. at 192.
8 Id. at 192-93.
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sodomy is not encompassed within the core value sought to be
protected), the Court could not rely on its own (or anyone else's)
moral preferences to interpret the constitutional text as requiring
the invalidation of the Georgia law. Whether the text itself might
be vague enough to be susceptible to such an expansive reading had
no bearing.8 5 Such is the exclusionary force of the framers'
practical authority: the moral conclusions evident in the historical
record exclude from the Court's reasoning any independent
consideration of substantive values and provide the only permissible
basis for the Court's interpretive decision-making. And such is the
nature of practical authority as defined by Raz.
H. JUSTIFYING THE FRAMERS' PRACTcAL AUTHORITY

A. Legitimate PracticalAuthority
According to Raz, a practical authority is legitimate (an entity
justifiably is accorded or claims to be a practical authority) if it
"serves" its subjects.8 6 This "service conception" of authority is
expressed by Raz's "Normal Justification Thesis": "IT]he normal
way to establish that a person has authority over another person
involves showing that the alleged subject is better likely to comply
with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority
as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by
trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly."87 A
subject is served by a practical authority if obedience, rather than
independent calculation, is more likely to yield action in accordance
88
with the balance of antecedently existing first-order reasons.
People are poor calculators of reasons for action. A practical
authority is legitimate if, on the whole, it is a more superior
calculator of first-order reasons than its subjects, solving the
89
problem of frequent moral error.

85 See id. at 194-96 (declining to expand the reach of the Due Process Clause); see

also Robin L. West, The AuthoritarianImpulse in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 531,532 (1988) (describing the distinction made by the Supreme Courtbetween
constitutional issues and moral issues and calling the former "amoral").

86
See RAZ, supra note 1, at 55-56.
8
7 Id. at 53.

8 See id. at 53-57.
89 See id. at 53; Alexander, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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The Obligations of Citizens

Recall that according to Raz's Dependence Thesis legal authorities should promulgate rules that sum up the balance of antecedently existing first-order reasons that would apply to citizens in the
absence of legal authority. g° If the lawmaker exhibits greater
reason-calculating expertise than the citizen, and if the lawmaker
adheres to the Dependence Thesis in its promulgation of laws, then
the Normal Justification Thesis will necessarily be satisfied. By
accepting the result of the lawmaker's (probably more accurate)
calculation of the balance of reasons as a protected reason, and
foregoing an attempt to run the calculation for himself, the citizen
will be more likely to act in accordance with the balance of firstorder reasons applicable to him. As Raz insists, it is only when the
Normal Justification Thesis is satisfied that the Preemptive Thesis
applies. 91
Only when the lawmaker is a better calculator of
reasons than the citizen can it make any sense for the citizen to
refrain from examining for himself his own reasons for action; only
when the citizen is more prone to moral error than the lawmaker is
the lawmaker's practical authority over the citizen legitimate.
A citizen's obligation to obey the law of a state is coextensive
with the state's legitimate authority over that citizen. 92 From this
follows the most surprising aspect of the Normal Justification
Thesis: there is no general obligation to obey the law. 93 If a
subject happens to be more of an expert in a given area than the
legal authority and is therefore more likely than the legal authority
to calculate correctly the balance of first-order reasons, then the
lawgiver is not a legitimate practical authority for that subject over
that area. The result is that "the extent of governmental authority
varies from individual to individual, and is more limited than the
authority governments claim for themselves in the case of most
94
people."

Raz recognizes that the service conception's narrow understanding of authority's legitimacy "invites a piecemeal approach to the
questions of the authority of governments." 95 There will be many
people in a multitude of situations with respect to whom the
go See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
91 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 46.
92 See id. at 99-105.

93 See RAZ, supra note 27, at 233-49.
94 RAZ, supra note 1, at 80.
95 Id.
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lawmaker will not have better reason-calculating expertise and for
whom the law therefore will not satisfy the requirements for
legitimacy established by the Normal Justification Thesis. An
example, offered by Raz, of a situation in which the law does not
have a legitimate claim to practical authority is that of the auto
mechanic whose expertise in the area of automobile design,
function, and repair, combined with "an unimpeachable moral
character," 96 renders him exempt from an obligation to obey the
law's commands regarding "the road worthiness of his car."97 It
is not that the law is necessarily unjust; it is just that the mechanic
is apt "to do better if [he] refuse[s] to acknowledge the authority of
this law." 98 In this situation, the law's claim of authority is simply
not justified. 99
Despite the piecemeal legitimacy of legal authority offered by
the Normal Justification Thesis, there are justifications of general
applicability that support a practical authority's legitimacy. These
justifications describe situations in which the legal authority will
always be a better calculator of reasons than any individual citizen.
For example, a central authority is necessary to solve coordination
problems, such as getting everybody to drive on the same side of the
road. In this situation there is no "right" answer. What matters is
that everybody does the same thing. Since only a centralized
practical authority can guarantee universal compliance, by giving
protected reasons for coordinated action, law's claim of practical
100
authority is legitimate in these situations.
The "prisoners' dilemma" provides a second broad justification
for legal authority.10 1 A prisoners' dilemma arises when each
individual can benefit by acting self-interestedly, but overall benefit
is maximized when everyone acts cooperatively. One individual's
benefit is maximized by acting self-interestedly when all others act
96

Id. at 78.

97 Id.
98 Id.

" For additional analyses of situations in which it would be irrational for an
independent moral agent to defer to authority, see Regan, supra note 1, at 1030-31;
Schauer, supra note 1, at 691-92; M.B.E. Smith, Is There a PrimaFacie Obligation to
Obey the Law?, 82 YALE LJ. 950 (1973).
100 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 30, 49-50, 56; see also Leslie Green, Law, Legitimacy,
and Consent, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 795 (1989) [hereinafter Green, Legitimacy]; Leslie
Green, Law, Coordinationand the Common Good, 3 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1983);
Regan, supra note 1, at 1024. But see Hurd, supra note 1, at 1632-35 (rejecting the
need for new reasons to ensure universal compliance).
101 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 50-51.
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cooperatively and one's benefit is minimized by acting cooperatively
while all others act self-interestedly. The non-optimal situation of
everyone's acting self-interestedly leaves everyone worse off than if
everyone acted cooperatively, but acting self-interestedly insures one
against the worst-case scenario in which one is the only cooperative
actor. Thus, each individual's most rational choice is to act selfinterestedly.1 0 2 In a prisoners' dilemma situation, "individually
rational behavior is jointly inefficient because it leads to an outcome
[(everyone's acting self-interestedly)] ...

which each prefers less

than another [(everyone's acting cooperatively)]... that is available
to them."10 3 A central authority is needed to provide everyone
with a sufficient reason to act cooperatively, so that no cooperating
individual faces the risk of being the worst off. The law accomplishes this task by claiming practical authority over everybody, demanding cooperative action, and providing an exclusionary reason that
bars consideration of the reasons not to cooperate. Since the
overall best result is achieved by everyone's cooperation and since
only the law's centralized authority will guarantee full cooperation,
law's claim to practical authority is legitimate when prisoners'
dilemmas arise.1 0 4
Nevertheless, neither prisoners' dilemma
situations nor coordination problems provide a general justification
for law's authority, such that all citizens have a general obligation to
obey all (or even most) of the time.
In addition to the Normal Justification Thesis, Raz offers
"consent" and "respect for the law" as two possible secondary
justifications that can establish the legitimacy of a state's claim of
practical authority. To the extent that an individual legitimately
consents to governmental authority, or has legitimate respect for the
state's laws, then that individual has additional secondary reasons to
treat the state as a legitimate practical authority. These justifications are supplemental to the service conception of authority,
however. The Normal Justification Thesis remains the primary
means by which an authority is legitimated because the two
secondary reasons offer no independentjustification for law's claim
10 2

See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOwARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957)

(discussing the prisoners' dilemma in terms of game theory); ROY SORENSON,
BLINDSPOTS 4-7 (1988) (same).
0
1 3 ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 124 (1974).

104 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 50-51, 56.
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of practical authority apart from the Normal Justification Thesis.

10 5

Raz acknowledges the force of consent in providing a citizen
with an obligation to treat his government as having legitimate
practical authority.1" 6 He accepts as legitimate only actual con10 7
sent that is both voluntary and fully informed, however.
Furthermore, even if consent is freely and knowingly given the
citizen is bound by that consent only if it satisfies the condition that
"[a]cting on the government's directives will promote one's success
in following right reason."10 8 As Raz points out, consent is
binding only if the authority itself satisfies the conditions "establish-9
10
ing the legitimacy of an authority independently of consent."
Thus, consent is valid only when the Normal Justification Thesis is
satisfied by the authority to whom consent is given. It is therefore
difficult to see how consent does any work at all in justifying a
government's claim to authority. Certainly a consenting citizen has
greater incentive to obey legitimate, authoritative dictates of the
legal authority than a nonconsenting citizen. 110 But the presence
of that consent is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
the law's legitimacy.1 1 1 For Raz, the value of consent seems to be
112
merely instrumental.
Raz also develops a theory about how respect for the law can be
manifested by a citizen's self-expression. Such a person has an
obligation to obey the laws of the state so long as: the legal system
is worthy of respect; the community recognizes respect for the law
as an "appropriate and desirable expression of identification with
the community;" 1 13 and this form of expression is inculcated as
14
part of the general process of socialization in the community.1
105 See id. at 88-101.

See id. at 80-94.
107 See id. at 81, 88-90.
108 Green, Legitimacy, supra note 100, at 810. This is just a restatement of the
106

Normal Justification Thesis. See id. at 810 n.33.
109 RAZ, supra note 1, at 21-22.
10

See id. at 89-90. Such incentive is by no means always a good thing, as "[lt

may mislead people into obeying the law where, but for consent, it would have been
clear to them that it is better to disobey. An extreme example of this kind of
distortion is provided by the scruples of many German generals about breaking their
oath of loyalty." Id. at 90.
...
See id. at 88.
112
But see id. at 92 ("Noninstrumental validations of consent are ... limited to
consent to the authority of a reasonably just government.").
11 Green, Legitimacy, supra note 100, at 815.
114 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 94-99.
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Raz points out thatjust because identification with one's (reasonably
just) community is a good thing and accepting the state's authority
is a good way of expressing that identification, it does not follow
1 15
that one has an obligation to accept the state's authority.
Obligation only follows from the individual's actual, unself-con116
scious acceptance of authority.
Raz distinguishes respect for the law from consent. Consent
must be a conscious, willful decision of the mind, 1 17 while respect
is a general mindset that evolves over time as "the product of a
gradual process as lengthy as the process of acquiring a sense of
belonging to a community and identifying with it." 118 Yet the fact
that such respect is only a good thing in a "reasonably just"11 9
society implies that respect for the law, like consent, has obligatory
force only when the state's authority is otherwise legitimate. Again,
the test for legitimacy may be the requirements of the Normal
120
Justification Thesis.
Despite the operation of consent and respect for law to create
or reinforce obligations to obey the law there is still, under Raz's
theory, no general obligation for citizens to obey the law. Raz
concludes that there is no prima facie obligation to obey the law
that transcends the bounds of a state's legitimate authority as
121
defined by the Normal Justification Thesis.
2. The Obligations of Judges
Although the law has no legitimate claim to practical authority
over all citizens all of the time, it does appear that there is a
broader obligation to obey for judges. In addition to the Normal
Justification Thesis, there are other reasons why judges should treat
the laws of a legal system of which they are a part as the binding
commands of a legitimate practical authority.1 22 First, a judge's
115 See id. at 99.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 81.
118

Id. at 98.
Id. at 99.
The notion of a relationship between a society's being "reasonably just" and
the NormalJustification Thesis is explored in greater detail infra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text.
121 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 101-02.
122 Note once again that these reasons only apply in a legal system that is
"reasonablyjust." This depends, to some extent, on the Normal Justification Thesis
being satisfied. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
119
120
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adherence to the law yields systemic benefits that do not necessarily
follow from citizens' obedience. 123 Among these benefits are the
rule of law virtues discussed earlier, 124 including liberty, which is
served by judges applying the law in a predictable and consistent
manner.1 25
Predictability enhances liberty by increasing the
number of options available to individuals. In the absence of
predictability people will avoid choosing certain options because of
the fear of potential reprisal. 126 Since this kind of predictability
is achievable only if judges defer to the authority of law without
engaging in their own moral balancing, liberty enhancement gives
judges a "reason to regard the laws of [their] system as possessing
legitimate authority and thus as obligating" them in their role as
12 7
judges.
Second, Raz implies that we all have a moral obligation to
support just institutions. 128
To the extent that disobedience
undermines the state's authority by setting a bad example, disobedience in a just legal system is contrary to this moral obligation.
Because disobedience by citizens typically does not engender
general lawlessness, Raz thinks it a "melodramatic exaggeration" to
suppose that every disobedient act endangers the state or law and
order.1 2 9 But given that lawless behavior by judges acting in their
official capacity would very likely discourage citizens from viewing
the law as worthy of obedience, it would seem that "judges have a
130
special obligation to obey the laws as they judge."
Finally, judges, unlike native-born citizens, usually take an oath
of office in which they swear to uphold the laws of the state. When
judges take oaths voluntarily, such oaths are equivalent to promises.
They are examples of what Raz refers to as the exercise of the
normative power to create voluntary obligations. 131 People have
123 See Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified 43-115 (1992) (unpub-

lished manuscript, on file with the author) (addressing the systemic benefits to be
derived from judicial obedience).
124 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
125 See Moore, supra note 1, at 836.
126 See id.
127

Id.
128 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 101; RAZ, supra note 27, at 237-42, 245-49.
129 RAZ, supra note 1, at 102.
130 Moore, supra note 1, at 836. Here, too, this obligation of the judge depends
upon the existence of a reasonablyjust legal system. See id.; infra text accompanying
notes 141-43.
131 See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY:

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210 (P.M.S. Hacker &Joseph Raz eds., 1977);
Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 916, 927-33 (1982) (book
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the capacity to create new reasons for action that morally obligate,
and making a promise "transforms one's reasons, creating a new
reason not previously there." 13 2 This exercise of a normative
power is the functional equivalent of a person at one moment in
time exercising practical authority over himself at some later point
in time. The judge's exercise of his normative powers, by taking an
oath of office, obligates him to apply the law and to exclude from
consideration otherwise countervailing factors, such as his own
superior reason-calculating ability. As with consent, however, the
validity of promises is limited by the legitimacy (perhaps, in the case
to the Normal Justification Thesis) of
of judicial oaths, according
133
promised.
what is
In addition to the above three reasons, the Normal Justification
Thesis obligates judges beyond the basic situation in which the legal
authority is a better calculator of the balance of first-order reasons.
Because the judge is the agent that applies the law, the Normal
Justification Thesis obligates the judge to a greater degree than it
does citizens.
If the law is a legitimate practical authority for the citizen, the
judge is obligated to apply the law even in cases where the judge
calculates reasons better than the lawmaking authority. Imagine a
judge who is an expert auto mechanic and a scrupulously moral
person. The laws determining an automobile's road worthiness may
not be authoritative for this judge, because of his superior technical
expertise.13 4 Nevertheless, when a citizen unskilled in the intricacies of automobile design comes before the judge in a case in which
such laws are applicable, the judge is bound to apply these laws to
this citizen. This is so for two reasons. First, if, as Raz asserts, the
judge's role is to apply the legitimate laws of the legal system, and
these laws are, according to the Normal Justification Thesis,
legitimate for this citizen, then his role as a judge is to apply the
laws. i3 5 Second, if we define "guilty" as having violated one's
obligation to obey the law and "innocent" as not having done so,
and if we further adopt what Rolf Sartorius has dubbed the
"Reflection Principle," according to which all and only the guilty
review).

132 RAZ, supra note 1, at 387.
133 See id. at 388; see also id. at 82, 173 (discussing promises that are not valid,

including those concerning the actions of other persons and those considered
immoral).
134 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
135 See RAZ, supra note 27, at 105-15.
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should be punished,1 3 6 then it follows that the judge must respect
the legitimate authority of the law for the citizen because it is that
legitimacy that determines the extent of the citizen's obligation to
1 37

obey.

Even in cases where the law is not a legitimate authority for
either citizen or judge, if the citizen believes, albeit incorrectly, that
he has an obligation to obey (because of an incorrect belief that the
lawmaker satisfies the Normal Justification Thesis and the law is
legitimately binding), then the judge must honor that citizen's
expectations. For example, imagine that both judge and citizen are
expert auto mechanics. The citizen mechanic is unaware, however,
that he is better than the legal authorities at calculating first-order
reasons applicable to road worthiness. The citizen then wrongly
believes that he is obligated to treat the road worthiness laws as
binding authority; he believes that they give him protected reasons
for action.

The judge might then be faced with one of four scenarios: (1)
the citizen obeyed the road worthiness laws, and did the right thing
by not driving his old jalopy, which belongs in a junkyard; (2) the
citizen obeyed the road worthiness laws, and did the wrong thing by
driving his old jalopy, which belongs in the junkyard, although the
law allows it to be driven; (3) the citizen violated the road worthiness laws, and did the right thing by driving his old jalopy, which is
prohibited by law from being driven, although it presents no hazard;
or (4) the citizen violated the road worthiness laws, and did the
wrong thing by driving his old jalopy, which belongs in thejunkyard
and is prohibited by law from being driven.
Of these scenarios only (3) is problematic. In (1) and (2),
respect for the citizen's liberty (by honoring his expectations about
the law), as well as a sense of fairness, require the judge to enforce
the road worthiness laws by pronouncing the citizen "innocent." 138 In (4), the citizen has violated a law he believes to be
136 See ROLF E. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NoRMs:

A

UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW 56-57 (1975).
Sartorius, along with Larry Alexander, rejects the reflection principle. See id.;
Alexander, supra note 1, at 10 & n.8.
157 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; RAZ, supra note 1, at 99-105.
138 On the definitions of "innocent" and "guilty" in these hypotheticals, see supra
text accompanying note 136. Another way of looking at these situations is to
recognize that the citizen must have the support of the person acting the "role" of
judge to successfully carry out his "role" as citizen. The citizen depends on thejudge
to enforce the law, even if the law is wrong. For a discussion of the interrelationship

of roles in a law-governed society, see MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH,
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legitimate and has gotten it wrong to boot. There does not seem to
be any reason for the judge to refrain from enforcing the law by
pronouncing him "guilty." In (3), however, the judge is presented
with a problem. As in (4), honoring the citizen's expectations
weighs in favor of a "guilty" verdict. But these laws are not
legitimately authoritative for the citizen, even though he believes
them to be. Disregarding any problems about setting a bad
example, the citizen has not done anything "wrong," and the judge
knows it, since he, like the citizen, has more automotive expertise
than the lawmakers. Scenario (3) can only be resolved by balancing
the value of honoring expectations, and the liberty enhancement
thereby served, against the fact that the citizen did the right thing,
all things considered, by disregarding a law that is not even
legitimately binding on him. 139 In the other three scenarios, the
judge is bound to honor the citizen's expectations about the laws'
authoritativeness, even though the laws satisfy the Normal Justifica140
tion Thesis for neither the citizen nor the judge.
The Normal Justification Thesis helps determine the extent of
the judge's obligation to obey the law in one more way. A reason
for obligation is conditioned on the relevant legal system being
"reasonably just" in several instances previously described: respect
for the law, 141 the duty to uphold just systems, 1 42 and the

judge's duty to serve the rule of law virtues.143 The question that
necessarily arises is how to determine whether a society is reasonDISCRETION TO DISOBEY 17-18 (1973).

Perhaps the tension can be resolved by an appeal to the proper relationship
between the respective roles of citizen and judge. See supra note 138. From this
perspective, the disobedience of the citizen should yield a guilty verdict, regardless
of the merits of his action because that is the only outcome that properly respects the
roles of both citizen (to obey the law) and judge (to enforce the law). See KADISH &
KADISH, supra note 138, at 17-18. But cf.id. at 29-33 (discussing when departures in
139

roles are justified).

140 Scenario (2) can also be problematic in a radically unjust society. If citizens
know that they will never be punished for committing atrocities if they can claim a
mantle of "lawfulness," then there is always the danger of spreading evil. This danger
does not mean that thejudge within the evil-promoting legal system is free to punish
the law-abiding evildoer within the system of evil laws. Rather, in order to do justice,
the judge must step out of his role as judge; then he can pursue justice in his private
capacity as an independent moral agent. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 182-83 (1980); J. Clifford Wallace, The
JurisprudenceofjudicialRestraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1,
7 (1981).
141 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
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ablyjust. Raz does not directly address this question. There are at
least two possible approaches to the issue. One is to examine the
procedural aspects of the system and ask whether the system
exhibits fairness in adjudication. An alternative is to focus on the
substantive justice of the regime's laws. In the latter approach, a
reasonable method for measuring a system's justice would involve
use of the service conception of authority. If a legal system satisfies
the Normal Justification Thesis for a reasonable percentage of its
citizens, then the system is reasonably just. That is, if a system's
lawmaker adheres to the Dependence Thesis in promulgating laws,
and exhibits, overall, greater reason-calculating capacity than its
citizens, it is fair to characterize the system as reasonably just.
In summary, the service conception of law's legitimacy does not
provide citizens with a general obligation to obey the law. The
combination of the Normal Justification Thesis and the special
concerns inherent in the judge's role, however, create a broader
obligation for the judge to treat the laws of the legal system as
bindingly authoritative. To a much greater degree than the citizen,
the judge is preempted from further investigation of the values that
underlie the laws and is precluded from considering relevant
concerns 144
that might weigh against following the law in a given
situation.

Nevertheless, Raz contends that under his theory of authority's
legitimacy there is still no general obligation of obedience even for
the judges within a legal system since the "additional reasons for
obeying the law which apply to judges, at least in reasonably just
societies ...

[do not] amount to a binding moral obligation in all

cases." 145 The piecemeal nature of the obligation to obey holds
for judges as well, albeit to a lesser extent than for citizens.
B. The Legitimacy of Originalism
I have explained how Raz's arguments for the legitimacy of legal
authority depend on a lawmaker's possessing greater expertise in
balancing first-order reasons than the law's subjects. How then
would the service conception of authority apply to the framers?
Under the Normal Justification Thesis, are originalists justified in
144 CompareSchauer, supranote 1, at 692 (arguing in favor of role-relative reasons
for action applicable to judges) with Hurd, supra note 123 (disputing the existence of
role-relative reasons forjudicial action).
145 Raz, supra note 51, at 1170 n.28.
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according practical authority to the framers over the judge's
interpretive enterprise? There are at least two ways in which the
framers might satisfy the thesis. First, the drafters of the Constitution and its amendments might have been moral geniuses whose
understanding of democratic government far exceeds that of any
judge today. Alternatively, the American process of constitutionmaking might be such that ,only by adhering to the moral conclusions arrived at through that process are the best possible results
guaranteed. After briefly examining these two propositions, I
consider whether originalists would accept Raz's thesis of a legal
authority's legitimacy. After determining that they would not, I am
left with an intriguing situation: originalists adopt Raz's model of
how authority works, 146 yet they reject his explanation of when an
entity is justified in claiming such authority. I then examine
consent and judicial restraint as alternative grounds for the
legitimacy of the framers' authority before concluding that origina-

lists cannot justify granting Razian practical authority to the
framers.
1. The Framers and the Normal Justification Thesis
Whatever their qualities and their legacy, it is difficult to believe
that the framers were moral geniuses. Yet at least one scholar
critical of strict originalism, David Richards, seems to accept the
proposition that the framers were best situated to make a democratic Constitution. He writes: "What makes the American Founders
so remarkable is the way in which ... [they] combined extensive
practical experience as politicians working in democratic institutions
with an astonishing grasp of the political philosophy and political
science of an enlightened age." 14 7 To Richards, the framers "were
great lawyers, political leaders, and intellectuals of the first rank,"
such that "[tiheory and practice were... powerfully interwoven in
one of history's greatest demonstrations of the deliberative powers
of the democratic reason of a free people." 148 Richards believes
that "constitutional conservativism" can be justified by articulating
"for Americans today the quality of the moral and intellectual
achievement of their remarkable Founders and demand[ing] that
this most precious heritage be conserved with the same quality of
146 See supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
147

Richards, supra note 70, at 1397.

148 Id. at 1397-98.
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intellectual and moral depth and rigor with which it was invented." 149 This justification for according legitimate practical authority to the framers seems to be based on the idea that the
framers were the right men in the right place at the right time. But
however admirable they may be, the small group of aristocrats who
convened in Philadelphia over 200 years ago were not in an
intellectually and morally superior position to analyze and sum up
the reasons for action applicable in modern society. Furthermore,
no originalist has advanced the idea that the innate superiority of
the framers is a justification for looking to their intentions as the
authoritative source of constitutional meaning.
The sense that the drafting of the Constitution was an ideal
process is another possible reason for concluding that the framers'
intentions better strike the balance of first-order reasons than do a
judge's own consideration of the relevant factors. The problem with
this argument is that the only output of the constitutional convention and the ratifying conventions was the Constitution itself, not
the intentions of the participants in the process. "Nothing but the
text itself was adopted by the people," according to Justice Story.150 While it is possible to argue in favor of the texts authority
based on the quality of the process that produced it, no such
argument is possible with regard to framers' intent.
It thus appears difficult to construct a plausible argument, based
on the NormalJustification Thesis, for according practical authority
to the framers' intentions. This difficulty is moot, however, since
originalists would be unlikely to accept Raz's account of when
authority is justified, at least as applied to the authority of the
framers over thejudge. There are two reasons why this is so. First,
originalists would reject the piecemeal nature of the obligation to
obey imposed by the Normal Justification Thesis. 15 1 Regardless
of any superiority in reason-balancing capacity a judge may have,
originalists demand that the judge always treat the intentions of the
framers as providing binding, protected reasons for interpreting the
text in accordance with those intentions. 152 Any justification of
framers' authority that has the potential of excusing the judge from
149 Id. at 1399-1400.
150 1JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
300 (Boston, Little Brown 4th ed. 1873).
151 See supra notes 93-95, 145 and accompanying text.
152 See suPra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the deferential posture favored by originalists is therefore unacceptable.
Second, originalists do not think that the judge's obligation to
give binding effect to the intentions of the framers has anything to
do with who is more likely to get the balance of reasons right. For
originalists, the meaning of the Constitution's text is the intent of
the framers. "This is the essence of communication. It is for the
writer to explain what his words mean .. . .153
Originalists hold
to an "intentionalist" theory of meaning. They believe that "[i]t
would ... be a contradiction in terms" 154 to speak of meaning
apart from authorial intentions and that to "assign a meaning
different from the one intended by the original authors.., merely
substitutes some other hypothetical author for the historical
ones." 155 Because of the definitional force ascribed by originalists
to the intentions of the framers, they would reject any theory of
justification, such as Raz's, that might provide the judge with the
freedom to look elsewhere for interpretive meaning.
The importance (if any) of authorial intent in textual interpretation is not a settled issue, however. 156 Scholars in many interpretive disciplines, including law, literature, religion, art, and music,
have for some time been engaged in a heated debate over the
relevance of intent.1 57 There have been significant attempts to set
forth an intentionalist theory of meaning. 158 But such theories
153 Raoul Berger, OriginalistTheories of ConstitutionalInterpretation,73 CORNELL

L. REv. 350, 353 (1988).
154 Kay, supra note 60, at 231.
155 Id.; see also ELY, supra note 140, at 3.
156 See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAvES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 25-27
(1989) (addressing the controversy regarding interpretation based on authorial intent
and rejecting the view that "history is valuable because it enables us to recapture the
author's intentions and so the meaning of his text" because authors' "audiences will
understand their texts in ways that have nothing to do with their intentions").
157 See, e.g., INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE at x-xii (Sanford Levinson &
Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (discussing current controversies in modem interpretive
theory); Sanford Levinson &J.M. Balkin, Law, Musi, and Other PerformingArts, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1597-614, 1654-58 (1991) (discussing the relevance to legal
interpretation of current interpretive disputes within music, literature, and other
arts); see also Daniel A. Farber, The OriginalismDebate: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. LJ. 1085, 1101 (1989) (noting that "it is not dear that the meaning even of
ordinary texts is to be located in the author's intent as opposed to the reader's
understanding" and that "[t]heories of interpretation are presently the subject of hot
dispute among philosophers and literary theorists").
158

The most plausible intentionalist theory of meaning is that propounded by

Paul Grice, whose only book, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989), contains his

1967 WilliamJames Lectures. The most relevant chapter is "Utterer's Meaning and
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have been subjected to severe criticism on both rational 59 and
moral grounds. 160 Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the
application of intentionalist theories of meaning is that any attempt
to close off the interpretive enterprise by appeal to a final interpretive authority is doomed to failure because of an unavoidable
infinite regression, since the authoritative interpreter must itself be
161
interpreted.
2. The Argument from Consent
Given originalism's rejection of Raz's explanation for the
legitimacy of the framers' interpretive authority, the originalist is
faced with the predicament of having to provide a non-Razian
justification for treating the framers as endowed with Razian
practical authority. One possibility is a social contract or consentbased theory of legitimacy. As demonstrated previously, Raz's
definition of consent provides a legitimate basis for practical
162
authority only when the Normal Justification Thesis is satisfied.
But as this Comment has also shown, the limited nature of authority's legitimacy implied in that thesis makes it unacceptable to
originalists preoccupied with judicial restraint. 163 Any originalist
appeal to consent must rely on a less rigorous notion of valid
consent than that advocated by Raz.

Intentions." See also H.P. Grice, Meaning, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 436 (Jay F. Rosenberg & Charles Travis eds., 1971).
159 See Brest, supra note 54, at 209-24.
160 See Moore, supra note 48, at 352-58.
161 This objection is well stated by Herzog in a discussion of scriptural interpretation:

[Some would claim that i]f we have doubts about the meaning of some
passage of Scripture, we should accept the authoritative judgment of the
church.
From one point of view, this solution simply begs the question. After
all, does the church have privileged access to the meaning of the text? ...
And anyway don't we have to interpret their judgments when we receive

them? And wouldn't asking the church for instructions on interpreting its
previous judgments land us in a vicious regress? To be cogent, interpretive
disputes have to remain open, not be closed by some authoritative
judgment. Imposing an authoritative judgment isn't another approach to
interpretation; it's an attempt to escape the messy business of interpretation
altogether.
HERZOG,
supra note 156, at 142-43 (footnote omitted).
162

See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.

163 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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There are four possible consent-based sources of the framers'
authority: actual consent, historical consent, implied consent, and
hypothetical consent. 64 Actual consent is impossible to establish;1 65 there is certainly nothing in our history that indicates that
any significant portion of the American populace has given free,
voluntary consent to the interpretive authority of the framers. 166
Historical consent is, "of course, ... very implausible," 167 and is
therefore incoherent as a basis for the framers' authority over the
present generation of Americans.1 68 Implied (or tacit) consent
cannot be derived from the fact that no one has revolted against the
authoritative regime of framers' intent or amended it out of
existence, in part because a failure to try to change things does not
necessarily betoken consent 169 and in part because there has been
no such regime about which to complain. Until quite recently the
notion that the framers' intentions act as binding authority on
judges interpreting the Constitution has had little currency with
170
or the academy. 171
either the Justices of the Supreme Court
164 An extended forayinto the realm of consent theoryis beyond the scope of this

Comment. For analysis and criticism of consent theory in general, see HERZOG, supra
note 156. For discussions of the relationship between consent theory and political
authority, see RAZ, supra note 1, at 21-22, 80-94; A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL
PRINCIPLES AND POLMCAL OBLIGATIONS 79 (1979); Green, Legitimacy,supra note 100.
165 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 1, at 88 (noting "the well-known problem that most
citizens in any given society have not consented to the authority of their government"); SIMMONS, supra note 164, at 79 ("Since the earliest consent theories it has of
course been recognized that 'express consent' is not a suitably general ground for
political obligation. The paucity of express consenters is painfully apparent.").
166 Larry Simon estimates that approximately 21h% of the population participated
in the ratification process. See Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of The
Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretation
beJustified?,73 CAL. L. REV. 1482,1498 n.44
(1985).
167 SIMMONS, supranote 164, at 60. Simmons emphasizes that "onlyin very special
circumstances can the consent of one individual bind some other individual (even if
this latter individual is a descendant of the former)." Id.; see also IMMANUEL KANT, ON
THE OLD SAW 65, 69-70 (John R. Silber ed. & E.B. Ashton trans., University of
Pennsylvania Press 1974) (1793); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
§§ 112-18 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hacket Publishing 1980) (1690).
168 See Moore, supra note 2, at 120.
169 See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 164, at 79-100 (emphasizing that failure to
dissent is only rarely constitutive of consent, and discussing Locke's analysis of the
failure of implied consent); Brest, supra note 54, at 226 (noting that "[a]cquiescence
is not the same as 'consent,' which must be informed and knowingly and freely
given"); see also J.F.M. Hunter, The Logic of Social Contracts, DIALOGUE,June 1966, at
31 (discussing the prerequisites for implied consent).
170 As Justice Scalia mournfully concedes:
[O]riginalism is not, and perhaps [has] never been, the sole method of
constitutional exegesis. It would be hard to count on the fingers of both
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"[T]he practice of supplementing and derogating from the text and
original understanding is itself part of our constitutional tradition."172 Hypothetical consent is based on asking about what sort
of authority rational, self-interested persons would consent to if
given the choice. 173 Unfortunately, since answering this question
requires a moral theory about what sort of system of government is
deserving of consent, 174 theories based on hypothetical consent
collapse into theories of substantive morality and rational action 75 which, as noted above, grant "authority" only to the extent
that the framers' will is consistent with morality. 176 No social
contract theory provides a legitimate basis for according binding
177
practical authority to the framers' intentions.

hands and the toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one's youthful
head, the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what
the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the judges
currently thought it desirable for it to mean.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1989).
171 See, e.g., id. at 853 (noting that "many prominent and respected commentators
reject the original meaning of the Constitution as an authoritative guide").
172 Brest, supra note 54, at 225.
173 The most well-known formulation of a theory of political legitimacy based on
hypothetical consent is found inJOHN RAwLs, A THEORY oFJUSTICE (1971), in which
Rawls posits that the just society is that which would be consented to by social
contractors in an "original position" of ignorance about what their place in society is
destined to be. See id. at 136-42.
174 See id. passim.
175 See HERZOG, supra note 156, at 4, 34-35; SIMMONS, supra note 164, at 144.
176 Seesupanote 8 and accompanying text; infra note 190 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 68, at 23 (asserting that "[t]reating the
Constitution like a contract... is difficult to defend cogently"); see also Simon, supra
note 166, at 1495-519 (denying the consent-based justification of originalism).
According toJohn Simmons, "[t]he challenge ... remain[s] open to the modernday consent theorist to show us how government by consent can be made a reality."
SIMMONS, supra note 164, at 100. Owen Fiss argues that consent is never a proper
measure of the legitimacy of any political institution. "The legitimacy of particular
institutions, such as courts, depends not on the consent-implied or otherwise-of the
people, but rather on their competence, on the special contribution they make to the
quality of our social life." Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Cour4 1979 Term: Foreword:

The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38 (1979). Professor Fiss's description of the
desiderata of institutional legitimacy is consistent with the underlying assumptions of
Raz's service conception of legitimate authority. See supra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
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3. The Argument from Democracy
The most common justification given by originalists for their
interpretive theory is democracy. The argument is as follows:
Democracy means majority rule and some protection for individual
rights. Judges protect the individual from majority intrusion. In
order to be democratically legitimate, unelected judges must be
"constrained" by law, such as the Constitution. But judges must
interpret the Constitution in order to apply it to individual cases.
They may be insufficiently restrained.
Thus, we turn to an
originalist theory of interpretation because it is the only interpretive
methodology that sufficiently constrains judges and preserves
178
majoritarianism.
Justice Scalia articulates such a defense of originalism: "[T]he
main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution-or, for
that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law-is that the judges
will mistake their own predilections for the law." 179
Unlike
competing theories of interpretation, originalism "does not
aggravate the principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a
historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the
18 0
preferences of the judge himself."
Such reasoning is reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes. 181 Hobbes
insisted that the interpretive enterprise allows judges too much
freedom, posing a potential threat to the absolute authority of the
Sovereign. To minimize this threat, Hobbes declared that the only
true meaning of any law is to be found in the intentions of the
Sovereign, whose will is the source of all laws. By limiting interpretation to discovering the will of the Sovereign, Hobbes would
prevent judges from exercising their own authority in a way
threatening to the Sovereign.1 8 2 Hobbes was concerned with
protecting the authority of the King from meddling judges;
originalists make an analogous argument on behalf of the framers.
Larry Simon calls this argument a "residualist" justification for
originalism; it is based not so much on the virtues of originalism as
on the shortcomings of other interpretive methods.18 3
This
178 See Bork, supra note 59, at 43-52; Berger, supra note 54, at 4; ELY, supra note
140, at 4-9; Farber, supra note 157, at 1097.103; TUSHNET, supra note 68, at 26-27.
179 Scalia, supra note 170, at 863.
180 Id. at 864.
181 See THoMAs HOBBES, LEviATHAN 218-19 (Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (1651).
182 See id.

183 See Simon, supra note 166, at 1495; see also Scalia, supra note 170, at 863-64
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characterization is reinforced by Justice Scalia's choice of the title
"The Lesser Evil" for his defense of originalism. 1" According to
185
originalists, other methods allow judges too much discretion.
At first, this argument from democracy has appeal. Liberty, it
is argued, is intrinsically valuable. Democracy is the "extension of
liberty into the realm of social decisionmaking."18 6 Thus democracy, like liberty, is intrinsically valuable. To ensure adequate
protection of this fundamental value judges should "shrink from
abrogating legislative decisions and ...

look for ways to uphold

legislation rather than to strike it down."18 7 This argument
demonstrates that restraint is an important characteristic of the
judicial role in a democratic society. From the perspective of
legitimating the practical authority of the framers, however, this
argument says nothing about why it is the framers who should be
accorded the authoritative status originalism demands.1 88 It is
one thing to argue that judges should carefully consider the
important value of democracy before rejecting an attitude ofjudicial
restraint. It is another thing to say that judges must therefore
abdicate their capacity as independent moral agents in favor of
unquestioning adherence to the intentions of the Constitution's
long-dead authors, whose intentions were never even voted on by a
18 9
democratic majority.
The argument from democracy, while supportive of judicial
restraint, says nothing about the legitimacy of deference to framers'
intent and fails as a justification for the practical authority of the
framers. It is similarly unhelpful to claim that the framers' authority
derives from the congruency of their intentions with the dictates of
substantive morality. Such an argument grants the framers no
authority at all, since it recognizes the authoritative force of
morality, and supports acceding to the framers' will only to the
190
extent that their will coheres with morality's requirements.
(concluding that despite its shortcomings, originalism is better than nonoriginalism
because it avoids grantingjudges the excessive interpretive freedom characteristic of
nonoriginalism).
184 See Scalia, supra note 170.
185 See id. at 854, 863.
186 Wallace, supra note 140, at 5.

187 Id.
188 As noted earlier, their status as authors of the text does not uncontroversially
confer upon the framers any special authority over the text's meaning. See supra
notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 150, 166 and accompanying text.
190 See Moore, supra note 2, at 118.
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CONCLUSION
My stated intention 9 1 has been to explore the consequences
of examining originalism in the light of Raz's theory of practical
authority. At first, it appeared that Raz and the originalist share
much common ground; both insist on a model of authority
demanding obedience without questioning the reasons therefor. 192 On closer examination, however, it seems that Raz and the
originalist are only incidentally similar in their views of authority.
When we turn from an examination of how authority functions to
considerations of when and why authority is legitimate, the
similarities are shown to be for the most part illusory.
This
Comment has explained that under Raz's service conception theory
of authority's legitimacy it is highly unlikely that the framers'
authority could satisfy the requirements of the Normal Justification
Thesis. In any event, originalists would reject Raz's thesis because
it provides judges with an insufficiently broad obligation to obey.
I have also argued that even apart from the service conception of
authority originalists can offer no coherent, non-Razianjustification
for the framers' practical authority over the judge's interpretive
enterprise. There is no rational basis for the judge unquestioningly
to substitute the value choices of the framers for his own when
deciding how to interpret and apply the Constitution in a particular
case.
This analysis does not imply, however, that judges are unconstrained. As noted previously, any theory of adjudication within a
democratic society must weight heavily the intrinsic value of
democracy. 193 When examining the validity of a democratically
enacted statute by applying ambiguous constitutional text, the judge
must consider the possible harm that might result to democratic
values in selecting among possible interpretations. 194 But a vision
of democracy consisting of pure majoritarianism is overly simplified
and controversial. Thomas Nagel argued:
Majority rule is based, as Professor Ely points out, on a certain
conception of equality. Each member of a society is entitled to
have his preferences count the same as anyone else's ....

191 No irony intended.
192 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 140-89 and accompanying text.
194 See Wallace, supra note 140, at 5.
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But the acknowledgement of this kind of equality suggests the
possibility that there may be other morally important equalities,
also deserving the name of rights, whose protection may some19 5
times conflict with the unfettered operation of majority rule.
Most conceptions of democracy emphasize a necessary balance
between majoritarian preferences and individual rights. 196 This
balance is reflected in the Constitution itself.197 To require a
judge to give due deference to the value of democracy does not
necessitate the judge's complete abdication in the face of majoritarian value choices. To the contrary, "democracy" takes its place,
albeit a very prominent one, within the universe of reasons for
action that must guide the judge's interpretive enterprise.
If any truly rational approach to decision-making requires
consideration of the balance of all relevant reasons, including valueladen reasons pertaining tojustice, democracy, and the like, then no
value-free method of interpretation based on framers' intentions
can be rationally justified, and originalism cannot be a valid theory
of constitutional adjudication. Instead, judges must recognize
democracy's inherent value of liberty enhancement, and give
adequate weight to that value and due deference to the democratically pedigreed choices embodied in statutes at every step of the
adjudicative process.
The exposition of a democracy-based
nonoriginalist theory of constitutional interpretation is obviously
outside the scope of this Comment. But it is clear to me that
proper deference to democracy requires that thejudge demand very
strong evidence before according to the Constitution's text an
interpretation that invalidates democratic laws. AsJustice Scalia has
195

Thomas Nagel, The Supreme Court and Political Philosophy: Remarks on the
Afternoon Session, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 520 (1981) (footnotes omitted) (citing ELY,
supranote 140); see MARTIN EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONsTrTUTION
5 (1984); MICHAELJ. PERRY, MoRALrY, POLITICS, AND LAw 165 (1988).
196 See AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 195-96 (1989); ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133-34 (1956); H. B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1960); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Cour 1988
Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 76 (1989) ("[T]he
best approach insists that the term [democracy] include both substantive constitutional values
as well as the procedural norm of majority rule.").
197
see e.g., Wallace, supra note 140, at 2 ("[The Constitution is not entirely
democratic. There are limits on what the majority may do.... [C]onstitutional
protections and structures... represent significant practical restraints.on the scope
of majoritarian democracy.").
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observed, the real interpretive debate, in the end, comes down not
to whether originalism or some other theory is correct, but to a
dispute "concerning the nature and degree of evidence necessary to
"
demonstrate that constitutional evolution has occurred. 198

198 Scalia, supra note 170, at 864.

